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Quine’s thinking shares important traits with postmodernism. Robert J. Fogelin
has recently contrasted an austere side of his philosophy to an “open or soft
side”, most famously exhibited by claims about the indeterminacy of translation
and the inscrutability of reference. Toughness is pitted against openness in an
“apparent reconciliation of seemingly competing viewpoints” which, according
to Fogelin, “gives Quine’s position much of its attractiveness and resilience.” [1,
544] It is because of his characteristically rigorous anti-positivism, one might
speculate, that many of Quine’s fellow analytic philosophers allow him to get
away with the doctrine of “ontological relativity” which is anathema when
proclaimed by French theorists.1
In view of the dramatic contrast between speculative thought dressed in fashion-
able jargon and Quine’s sober accounts of the scientific status quo it might seem
frivolous even to suggest that his work exhibits a postmodern touch. The present
paper will, nevertheless, focus on Quine’s usage of the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem the-
orems as a prominent example of ontological relativity and will attempt to
show that Quine’s treatment is unattractive to philosophers of mathematics
and – more generally – untenable within the very methodology arising from
Quine’s basic approach. After examining the doctrine of relativity as applied to
the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem result two recent reflections on it’s theoretical impact
will be discussed. Those conetributions make a strong case against the kind
of attitude exemplified by Quine, but they do not address the general issue
of how to deal with relativism. Donald Davidson has provided a remarkably
attractive strategy to counter relativistic moves. Stripping away postmodernist
1 There is indeed a disturbing fuzziness in quotes like the following one picked at random from
the writings of Felix Guattari: “The relativity of points of view of space, time and energy
do not, for all that, absorb the real into the dream. The category of Time dissolves into
cosmological reflections on the Big Bang even as the category of irreversibility is affirmed.”
[2, 52]
Compare this to one of Quine’s remarks on space-time: “Maintaining the even tenor of our
ways, we can leave the time dimension independent of the spatial ones as we always have. But
we do well still to keep it firmly alongside, treating the world and its denizens tenselessly as
fourdimensional, simply for logical clarity and quite apart from relativity.” [3, 199]
pretensions this strategy challenges the peculiar Quinean mix of methodological
austerity and anti-foundationalism.
Quine on Skolem
Quine’s philosophical approach to the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorems is based
upon his famous epistemological scenario of radical interpretation. One quick
way to put the general idea is that there are no independent “meanings” that
could guide anyone in trying to make sense of initially incomprehensible ut-
terances. Sensory stimulations, processed by our conceptual apparatus, is all
we have at our disposal. We are, consequently, not entitled to assume ontolog-
ically autonomous features of the world. Conceptual processing of stimulation
enshrouds people within cognitive restrictions that force them to suspend judge-
ment on ultimate facts. A naturalistic approach – to jump right into Quine’s
argument in “Ontological Relativity” – does not provide the means to decide
whether the sentence “Grass is green” presumes the existence of a certain colour
or of an instantiated property.
The problem is that OS tension cannot distinguish between abstract singular
and concrete general terms. Pointing at grass and uttering the word “green”
may just as well be taken to refer to a quality of grass or to the property of
green exemplified by grass. The latter is, as Quine explains, a case of deferred
OS tension. “It occurs when we point at the gauge, and not the gasoline, to show
that there is gasoline.” [4, 40] Quine’s next remark takes this kind of argument
straight into the philosophy of logic. “Another such example is afforded by
the Go¨del numbering of expressions.” [4, loc.cit.] The gauge is to gasoline as a
number to some letter under a Go¨del mapping. The indeterminacy of reference
affects talk about worldly objects as well as talk about symbols. Quine switches
easily from his empiristic scenario to reflections on set-theoretical constructs.
Always, if the structure is there, applications will fall into place. As
paradigm it is perhaps sufficient to recall again this reflection on
expressions and Go¨del numbers: that even the pointing out of an
inscription is no final evidence that our talk is of expressions and
not of Go¨del numbers. We can always plead deferred ostension.” [4,
44]
The Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorems fit nicely into this account.
Given an uninterpreted formal system that can be provided with a model in an
uncountable domain this very same system has a countable model. We cannot,
by examining the logical pattern manifest in a set of sentences, decide whether
those sentences refer to the full array of real numbers or some appropriately
manipulated countable subset. The so-called Skolem paradox arises if one holds
a traditional semantic theory according to which a particular signum rigidly
refers to its designatum. Quine’s “principle of relativity” resolves the quandary.
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What makes sense is to say not what the objects of a theory are,
absolutely speaking, but how one theory of objects is interpretable
and reinterpretable in another. [4, 50]
This is because the theory forms at our disposal do not – auto-magically as it
were – pick out their intended models. Investigating their semantics we have
to provide such models. “Paraphrase in some antecedently familiar vocabulary,
then, is our only resource; and such is ontological relativity.”[4, 54]. Relativism
proves its worth in the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem case. Talk about the reference of
terms of a theory is devoid of meaning, unless relativised to a framing theory.
[4, 60]The message seems clear (and clearly favourable to postmodernism): one
cannot count on any basic tool-set to describe the world. Assertions always
depend on the circumstances of language use.
Uneasy Dialogues
In his paper quoted at the outset Robert J. Fogelin points to an inherent tension
in Quinean methodology. A thoroughly pragmatic naturalist will hardly be
impressed by the contrieved cases of indeterminacy constructed by Quine. She
will, in all likelihood, assume that translation manuals tend to converge and
refuse to worry about esoteric ontological principles.
A surprising feature of many of Quine’s arguments is that they
employ something very like Cartesian skeptical scenarios – though
applied to issues concerning meaning and reference rather than to
knowledge. [1, 563]
The force of Quine’s attack on well-established meanings depends on highly
artificial moves to shatter our common confidence in the working of language.
It is, for example, difficult to see why a naturalist should be worried by cosmic
counterparts and proxy functions.2 Such reservations are borne out by two
recent discussions of the philosophical impact of the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem result,
both of which employ the rhetorical device of fictional (meta-mathematical)
dialogues.
It is Quine himself who prepared the ground for using dialogues as a philosoph-
ical ploy. Radical interpretation is just a fancy name for trying to understand
complete strangers. Clearly, this is a limiting case in everyday linguistic practice
and we might relax those radical constraints to enquire into the conditions of
partial dialogical incomprehension. A clash of meta-mathematical doctrines is
a case in point. Since there is a lot of common ground among the participants
of such discussions the original gavagai scenario is ill suited to model the situ-
ation triggered by the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem proof. Still, it makes good Quinean
2 The idea of cosmic counterparts is that a speaker could refer to everything but a particular state
of affairs using a term conventionally referring to this state. Proxy functions are systematic,
truth-value preserving permutations of a given interpretation.
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sense to construct an idealised encounter of two language communities that
are at odds on how to understand each other’s use of certain terms, i.e. “num-
ber” or “set”. Stuart Shapiro imagines the following controversy between two
meta-mathematical “tribes”.
A guy names “Second” introduces standard second order semantics, the val-
ues of the property variables of his syntax ranging over all sets of numbers.
He proves that, given this interpretation of the underlying language, the real
numbers are uncountable. His contrahent, called “First”, balks at the phrase
“all sets of numbers”. She does not treat its meaning as an obvious extension
of the agreed upon notion of “all numbers” and asks for clarification. Second
complies, producing an axiomatized version of his initial, informal semantical
account. But the formal system he proposes is itself in need of interpretation
and so the dialogical mismatch repeats itself. Whereas Second regards his for-
mal construction as an explication of his semantic meta-theory for second order
logic, First takes it to be just another first order theory, open to a number of
competing interpretations. The meaning of “uncountable” in particular, remains
controversial. One party to the conflict takes it to be fixed by ordinary mathe-
matical practice, possibly supplemented by explanatory formalisation. But once
such formal constructions are put froward, the opposing party is free to pick
alternatives, i.e. an interpretation satisfying the predicate “uncountable” in a
countable domain. This is precisely Quine’s point: What an expression refers
to depends on the framing theory used to discuss its occurances in the object
language.
If both sides persist they will systematically talk past each other, dramati-
cally exemplifying the threat of all-pervasive mutual incomprehension between
language users. But this is obviously not the way such difficulties are ordi-
narily worked out. Shapiro, at this juncture, has an excellent point referring
to Wittgensteinian rule following. Mere words can never force an unique in-
terpretation upon us. Quine’s rejection of the “museum mythos” echoes this
part of Wittgenstein’s analysis. But this analysis does not rest content with
assigning different meanings to given expressions, depending on framing theo-
ries and thus inviting relativism. Wittgenstein is, at the same time, insisting
on the legitimacy of given language uses. Discursive practice, it is true, can be
interrupted by misunderstanding at almost every point. Speakers, nevertheless,
usually manage to resolve the ensuing puzzlement. If unsuccessful, they keep
using their respective language, without solving the conflict, but not without
right. Shapiro joins Putnam in stressing the fact that
There is an important aspect of mathematical practice – the use
of mathematical discourse – that is not captured by first-order lan-
guages . . . [5, 256]
Any attempts to brush away an ordinary mathematician’s untroubled under-
standing of “number“ or “set” can, in Putnam’s lucky phrase, “only have crazy
solutions” [6, 24]. Stuart Shapiro:
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My thesis here is that, for better or worse (well, for better), the at-
titude underlying the practice of mathematicians is that skepticism
is false. [5, 260]
Informal language can give rise to uncertainty and conflict, requiring clarifica-
tion in a more formal mode. But there is no appeal to anything but informal
understanding when repeated attempts at clarification fail.
Shapiro’s attitude is to reject relativism in favour of existing use. Some questions
are, inevitably, begged before so-called “unintended interpretations” of certain
phrases can be proposed. This is, however, an awkward way to put the issue. It
seems to re-establish a skeptical outlook on top of the attempt to put it at rest.
Isn’t the relativist saying precisely that existing uses, i.e. framing theories, are
always begging questions? A refinement of the argument is called for. It will
be given in two steps, the first one offering a closer look at question-begging
within the philosophy of mathematics. This is, as has already become evident,
but a special case of the general problem of relativism which will be addresses
in the concluding section.
Paul Benacerraf’s essay “What Mathematical Truth Could Not Be - I” is an
extended reflection on, as he puts it, extracting “philosophical juice from meta-
mathematical results”. [7, 36] His opening parable sets the stage. Lapidus, the
matchmaker, has considerable difficulties in convincing the Cohens that he has
got the right girl for their son. Beauty and wealth cannot overcome their oppo-
sition to a gentile woman. It is only when he reveals her identity that he secures
their approval: they cannot resist the appeal of their son marrying Princess Mar-
garet of England. Having fixed the deal Lapidus mutters to himself: “Whew.
Well, that’s half the job. [7, 34] Cheerfully exploiting this moral tale Benac-
erraf traces the impact of the “Princess Margaret premiss” in philosophical
accounts of the limitative theorems in meta-mathematics. Impressing the audi-
ence with a formal proof is the easy part, like overwhelming the Cohens with a
Royal name. Such proofs are not, however, in themselves philosophical moves.
In order to acquire their intended importance they have to be embedded in
philosophical argument. How this is to be done is not fixed by the formal proof,
just as the powerful appeal of a name is quite different from the behaviour
of the name’s bearer. Applied to the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem debate Benacerraf’s
challenge is this: We should not be unduly impressed by the mere possibility of
reading “uncountable” as countable.
Imagine, again, a dialogue involving Georgia, a student, and her teaching assis-
tant, a Skolemite. Her use of Cantorian techniques is challenged by her tutor
who claims that “she cannot write a set of first order axioms that are satisfiable
in an uncountable domain but not in any countable domain.” [7, 61] Georgina
tries in vain to give a first-order characterisation of her Cantorian understand-
ing of the term under discussion. All her attempts to capture her pre-formal
intuitions about undenumberability are squashed by the Skolemite who claims
to be able to come up with a countable model for any axiom system Georgina
might propose to formalise the semantic assumptions underlying her employ-
ment of set theory. The Skolemite’s rules “will always permit interpretations
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that place only demonstrably finite and countable sets in its (i.e. the predicate’s
‘uncountable’) extension.” [7, 65]. Relativism looms again.
Like Stuart Shapiro Benacerraf rejects the Skolemite by insisting on mathemat-
ical practice, but his argument is more sophisticated. Cantorian persuasions are
not justified because, as Shapiro puts it, “in the present situation, it looks like
questions must be begged”. [5, 247] Drawing attention to the “Princess Mar-
garet Premiss” is an attack on the relativist’s standing as partner in a dialogue.
The point is that it does not suffice to utter the words “Princess Margaret”
or “uncountable” to be entitled to be taken seriously. While Georgina cannot
prohibit strange uses of the term “uncountable” by the Skolemite, she is the
unconditional authority on how her language is to work and hence on how to
handle problem cases. She might be forced to express her beliefs in an idiom that
can be cleverly re-interpreted in order to subvert her cognitive arrangement. But
this does not indicate that her words lack definite meaning. An axiomatized sys-
tem is an empty shell and cannot serve to overthrow a mathematical practice
that happens to be richer than its expressive capacities. Benacerraf puts his
point in a nutshell:
The best comparison I can suggest is with trying to persuade some-
one who understands ordinary counting that she really has no con-
cept of 17 and 18 as distinct and intelligible cardinalities because
both get translated as ‘more’ into a language that has only ‘1’, ‘2’,
‘3’, . . . ‘13’, ‘more’ (and no more) as the available choices.” [7, 72]
The use of “more” in this scenario is no match to the use of “18”. It’s not
a case of unavoidable question begging but rather of the opponents failure to
achieve common ground.. Relativism falls flat without something the opposing
views are opposing each other about . Benacerraf’s defence of the operations of
a meta-language against attempts to fiddle with some of its predicates can be
generalised.
Davidson on Quine
The preceding summary of Paul Benacerraf’s contribution contains a fair
amount of Davidson. His criticism of Quine on ontological relativity is remi-
niscent of Hegel’s objections to Kant’s Ding an sich. Some factor X is supposed
to play an essential role in providing outside support for theoretical projections,
even though we can, within Kant’s epistemological design, never grasp any of
its qualities. Hegel regards this as a strange case of theoretical self-mutilation
and overrides Kant’s restrictions within his own peculiar holism. Donald David-
son has, likewise, found a strange impediment to holism in Quine, namely his
dualism of conceptual form and empirical content. It seems that Quine, in or-
der to call himself an empiricist, has to assume the extra-theoretical existence
of something that comes to be mediated conceptually. But language, Davidson
replies, cannot sensibly refer to an extra-linguistic given other than by the use
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of language. This move seems, at a first glance, to dismantle the accountability
of theories towards “the real world”. But the impression is mistaken. Davidson’s
move is, in fact, the cornerstone of a strong anti-relativistic position.
In rough outline the argument is this. Relativism plays off multiple, mutually
exclusive, world views against each other. This strategy, however, can only
work, if those views share a common point of reference, namely “the world”,
otherwise they cannot be said to be mutually exclusive. Just listing different
language games is an activity outside the scope of the present problem. But
now, assuming unsurmountable conflict, “the world” can be seen as a dubious
Ding an sich. Its function is to serve as a common denominator for theoretical
approaches that are, at the same time, thought to be incompatible to each
other. Davidson proposes to cut through this conceptual tangle and take one of
two positions. Either there is substantial common ground between competing
world views or so-called “competing world views” are mis-named since they do
not meet the minimum condition for there to be a competition, rather than,
for example, a struggle for survival of the fittest. In both cases the threat of
epistemological relativism disappears. This is but a sketch of the implications
of doing away with the form-content-distinction and cannot be further pursued
here. One of Davidson’s explanatory constructions will have to suffice to link
these considerations to the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem case.
A speaker, call him A, uses an expression, i.e. “Wilt”. B tries to understand A
and in doing so arrives at two conjectures.[8, 234] According to the first one,
“Wilt” refers to a person named Wilt; the alternative hypothesis correlates the
term with Wilt’s shadow. Both options seem feasible in view of the empirical
data at a given time. Should we infer that A’s linguistic utterance lacks reference
or that B is confused about persons and shadows? Of course not. One level up a
speaker C can easily disambiguate B’s claim that “By uttering ‘Wilt‘ A means
either Wilt or Wilt’s shadow.” The term “Wilt” works differently according
to the competing hypotheses which B, tentatively, ascribes to A. From C’s
point of view those hypotheses are different attempts, by B, to systematise A’s
linguistic activity. B’s use of “Wilt” and “Wilt’s shadow“ are entirely unaffected
by B’s hesitation regarding her semantic task. B must, in fact, be able to refer to
persons and shadows making up the environment she shares with A, if she wants
to get any hold on A’s pronouncements. Her inability to uniquely determine the
reference of a term in the object language does not imply that her own use of the
term, and in particular of terms translating the term under investigation into
her own language, is indeterminate. B can perfectly well distinguish between
Wilt and Wilt’s shadow, even though she is unclear about whether A means
one or the other by his use of a given expression.
The situation is suggestively similar to Shapiro’s and Benacerraf’s dialogues.
Bracket the physical connotations and substitute “uncountable” for “Wilt”. A
certain term can then be observed to systematically occur in an array of pat-
terns of language-like inscriptions. What’s his meaning? A Davidsonian has an
attractive answer which comes in three steps, corresponding to the hermeneu-
tical setup just rehearsed. At level A “uncountable” has no meaning, since
meanings are theoretical concepts developed in a meta-language. In the present
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case speaker B ascribes meanings to expressions of an uninterpreted calculus,
Benacerraf’s “empty shell”. There is just one way she can do this, namely by
employing her language capacities, finding an appropriate gloss for “uncount-
able” within her idiom. As it happens, that might not be a straightforward
affair. Refer to Shapiro and Benacerraf to fill in the details. But notice that –
given this setting – the appeal of relativistic doubts simply dissolves. It is up to
B to decide upon her theoretical investment, for instance to regard “uncount-
able” as a predicate satisfied by what she cannot but call the reals. This can
be perspicuously expressed at level C. Several hypotheses are at B’s disposal to
understand the role played by the term in the object language. Unless B wants
to get completely confused she is well advised to distinguish between different
interpretations she might want to impose upon a given linguistic phenomenon
and their possible indeterminacy as far as some hermeneutical setting is con-
cerned. Observe the contribution “uncountable” makes to the object language,
check alternative interpretations, take your choice. Relativism is replaced by
different commitments to radical translation.
Davidson’s dictum is entirely convincing: “Truth is relative to an object lan-
guage, but not to a metalanguage.” [8, 233] In order to get a hold on truth and
meaning we need the asymmetrical setup of levels A and B.3 The only way for
B to turn into a relativist is to become overly impressed by her own abilities
to develop allegedly incommensurable interpretational schemes, disregarding
the fact that those schemes are of her own making. Recall Davidson’s general
maxim: For world views to diverge they must be built on shared assumptions.
If they have nothing in common they do not merit to be called different views
of the world . As Wittgenstein famously put it: If lions could speak, we could
not understand them [9, 536]
All of this is in direct contradiction to Quine’s position and would, at least, de-
mand another paper for discussion. This one concludes with a quick hit against
postmodernism. Arguments in analytical philosophy, even those that propose
ontological relativity, bear systematic scrutiny. A close look at Quine’s paper
reveals him to be somewhat careless in his use of “theory”. The “empty shell”
we have been talking about is, in his parlance, a “theory form” (Quine 1969,
53) and he observes, correctly, that we cannot, given such a form, but guess at
the intended model. But he goes on to argue:
It is thus meaningless within the theory to say which of the various
possible models of our theory form is our real or intended model. [4,
54]
This passage is the analytic equivalent of the vernacular claim that we are
caught within the confines of our language, unable to attain a stance tran-
scending this contingency. The sentiment is certainly widespread. It is, however,
3 Such constructions can, of course, be iterated, turning the utterances of speaker B into an
object language. Such a ploy does not relativise B’s treatment of A. It just re-iterates the
only strategy available to deal with initially meaningless signs, i.e. to consider alternative
interpretations and to eventually apply one or the other.
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References
unfounded as can be seen by resolving a striking indeterminacy in Quine’s use
of the term “theory” in the preceeding passage. As long as semantical issues
remain undecided “within the theory” means: tentatively translating a theory
form. Such an enterprise does not suggest relativity. In order to arrive at onto-
logical relativity “within the theory” must also mean “as claimed by a certain
theory”. The core of relativism is this strategic fusion of non-commitment and
commitment into an apparently coherent position. Quine’s doctrine collapses
Davidson’s levels. He fails to distinguish between activities that try to make
sense of strange data and the second level awareness that there is, in general,
no unique solution to this kind of enterprise.
One can admit of doubts about the reference of component expressions of theory
forms. And one might well be able to overthrow many of the theories built upon
interpretations of theory forms. Here is one thing one cannot do: Make sense
of puzzling phenomena while abstaining from established language use. There
are no “free“ doubts, just as there is no free dinner. Even though the proposi-
tion sounds old-fashioned, its truth seems unassailable: substantive conflict, as
distinct from opposing slogans, demand considerable common effort.
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